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2nd McDonald’s in Vietnam

Ba:

I’m Stealin’ It
Vietnam and McCronyism
McDonald’s in Vietnam
In February 2014, McDonald’s opened its first restaurant in
Ho Chi Minh City (HCMC), Vietnam. As the eighth-most
populous country in Southeast Asia, Vietnam was the second-to-last middle-income country in Asia without a McDonald’s presence. Business specialists speculated that the
fast food company, which received 68% of its total revenues
of $27.57 billion from overseas markets as of 2012, opened
the HCMC franchise in response to declining sales in other Asian markets -- particularly China and Japan. McDonalds’ expansion into Vietnam followed that of other popular
American brands including Pizza Hut and Burger King. The
arrival of such international franchises are an indication of
Vietnam’s growing economic vibrancy and a result of increasing foreign investment in the Southeast Asian country.

litical and social stability, young population, and geographic
location positions Vietnam at a competitive advantage for
FDI. However, the reliance on patronage and personal relationships with members of the ruling party remains essential
for both domestic and foreign investors to conduct business
in the country’s promising economy. While an attractive prospect for FDI, the lack of administration and laws adequate for
competitive markets pose a serious problem for Vietnam.

All in the Family?
Political theorists and economists alike found the HCMC
McDonald’s franchise of particular interest for another reason – in its opening the restaurant associated with Henry
Nguyen, the son-in-law of Vietnam’s Prime Minister Nguyen
Tan Dung. McDonald’s move to partner with Henry Nguyen
Foreign Interests in Vietnam
incited speculation by both the Vietnamese and global public
Vietnam is an attractive prospect for foreign direct invest- that perhaps crony capitalism, where Nguyen’s familial ties
ment (FDI) given its position as a net exporter and its healthy and linkages with the government, rather than Nguyen’s edeconomy with high internal consumption. The country’s po- ucation and professional experience, led to his ownership of
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the popular franchise.
McDonald’s assured the public that Nguyen’s appointment
was due to his business expertise and company loyalty. Nguyen had, after all, worked for years as a McDonald’s employee
while Harvard University, before going on to earn business
and medical degrees from Northwestern University and work
on Wall Street. McDonald’s asserted that the combination of
Nguyen’s restaurant experience, and his work in the private
sector, positioned him as the logical choice to own and operate the Vietnamese franchise. McDonald’s vice president for
corporate relations confirms that, “the contract with Henry
Nguyen as developmental licensee (was) the result of a rigorous selection process that began years ago.”
Despite these statements from McDonald’s, however, the Viet-

namese public viewed Henry Nguyen’s appointment as a continuation of the current ruling party’s affinity for nepotism. A
pattern of party leaders appointing family members to top executive positions was commonplace in the “patronage-fuelled
business culture” of Vietnam and McDonald’s was seen as just
another normal business.
Understanding Crony Capitalism in Vietnam: A Look at its
Political and Economic History
Corruption in Vietnam, and the lack of legal consequences
and accountability deterred foreign investors to Vietnam af-
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ter the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis. Joint ventures remain the
most common way for foreign businesses to begin operations
in Vietnam. The equitization program- “the word ‘privatize’ is
still politically suspect”- forced state owned enterprises (SOE)
to limit the size of their workforce to allow for possible joint
ventures. Despite a series of legal addendums following admission to the World Trade Organization (WTO) and Association of Southeast Asian Nations, foreigners can have no more
than a 49% share in any local business. While joint ventures
represent a gradual mechanism for greater economic integration, they are still considered a risky endeavor for the CPV.
Effective functioning of any joint venture requires party support; “Corporations have been free to form joint ventures with
foreign partners and sell stakes to overseas investors- just so
long as the management, as a whole, does the Party’s bidding.
In return, they get access to preferential government support.”
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Vietnam’s Outlook
Vietnam is following suit of its Asian neighbors whereby economic growth is given precedence over democratic institutions. Unfortunately, underdeveloped democratic institutions
have enabled the persistence of crony capitalism and nepotism.
In the name of economic planning, ruling party members often hold excessive power in the decision making of industries
and businesses. Political scientists such as Francis Fukuyama
blamed “unique Asian systems” -- including widespread crony
capitalism -- as a cause of the 1997 financial crisis and a major
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obstacle to continuing high levels of economic growth in the
region.
Vietnam has enacted other reforms that it hopes will promote
equitable economic growth and limit corruption. These policies include reducing permit requirements, simplifying company establishment procedures, and the establishment of ‘onestop-shops,’ or businesses that offer a plethora of services. The
Global Competitiveness Report of 2012 reflected these reforms
to some extent in the Vietnam’s improved performance numbers, but according to the business community, Vietnamese
authorities still frequently change regulations without prior
notice and often apply these regulations in an opaque manner.

it is easier to manage with an authoritarian government but
an authoritarian government is equally likely to ensure that it
holds a financial stake in all Vietnamese business transactions.
Rather than amending laws that encourage competitive markets, in 2012, the CPV began a “criticism and self-criticism”

Thus the current system still strongly relies on patronage and
personal relationships with members of the ruling party. Private companies – both domestic and foreign – are willing to
pay large fees to obtain introductions to the family members
of the CPV elite. Even mission-driven organizations such as
the World Bank allow CPV leaders to set loan terms and conditions in order to conduct work in Vietnam.
The public has expressed “widespread [...] grievances” over
issues involving living standards, wealth inequality, land seizures, corruption, and cronyism in Vietnam. The anonymity
of the Internet has allowed critics to skirt tight media controls
and disclose scandals of crony capitalism to the public. Yet,
for the most part, CPV leaders maintain control over dissent
and have resisted calls to improve political rights. The country
experiences small-scale protests from several interest groups
-- mostly connected to land-use rights, political liberalization,
and dispute resolution mechanisms.
Vietnam is currently a negotiating member of the Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP), a large-scale free trade agreement that
would reduce trade barriers among countries on both sides of
the Pacific Ocean. For Vietnam, it offers a great opportunity to
liberalize its economy by limiting the power of SOEs. Because
SOEs offer a high share of tax revenues, domestic tariffs have
persisted in Vietnam. While the removal of tariffs is seen as an
encouraging sign for job creation and more equitable business
management, the case of McDonald’s shows that the presence
of foreign companies is hardly a sign of lessening crony capitalism and corrupt business practices.
Scholars suggest that the willingness of other countries to accept Vietnam in the TPP despite the fact that it is partially
a state controlled economy “speaks to the seriousness of the
government about reform and may also demonstrate that economic reform is easier to do in authoritarian states.” This shows
the paradoxical nature of economic liberalization in Vietnam;
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campaign to address shortcomings among the leadership
and strengthen the party’s legitimacy in Vietnam. In October
2012, the Prime Minister apologized publicly to the National
Assembly for mishandling state coffers. The government also
arrested several wealthy individuals closely associated with
Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung for “illegal business activities” and “economic crimes.” However, the value of these “reforms” remains in question, as the arrests were also considered
a power play engineered by the Prime Minister’s rivals. The
actual causes of Vietnam’s economic slowdown may require
further, deeper reforms to increase openness, transparency,
Rohit Sudarshan and Gizelle V. Gopez
and democracy.
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